Lessons learned from accident and near-accident experiences in traﬃc by Terum, Jens Andreas & Svartdal, Frode
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Safety Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/safety
Lessons learned from accident and near-accident experiences in traffic
Jens Andreas Terum⁎, Frode Svartdal
UiT The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø, Norway







A B S T R A C T
The focus of this article is risky behavior in traffic. What do people learn from accidents and near-accidents?
Experience with accidents may demand increased caution. However, near-accidents are inherently ambiguous:
On the one hand, they signal that margins were good enough, inspiring increased risk-taking; on the other hand,
they signal danger that could induce increased caution. To explore these issues, participants (N=614) answered
47 questions related to safe traffic behavior as well as reported on their experiences with traffic accidents and
near-accidents, assessing changes in cautiousness as well as cognitive (i.e., counterfactual thinking) and emo-
tional mechanisms possibly involved in learning from such experience. Results indicate that people do not be-
come more cautious after accidents, whereas repeated experiences with near-accidents seem to foster less
cautious traffic behavior. We discuss emotional and cognitive mechanisms related to these effects, and suggest
that cautiousness after near-accidents is associated with assuming personal responsibility and upward coun-
terfactual comparisons. We conclude that the mechanisms involved in learning from near-accidents are theo-
retically interesting, as well as important for the understanding of safe driving behavior.
1. Introduction
Individuals and organizations learn from obvious failures (e.g., Ellis
et al., 2014; Reason, 2016), but less is known about the lessons learned
from mere incidents and near-accidents. There are more incidents than
accidents, and therefore incidents could be a potent source of learning.
However, incidents and near-accidents are inherently ambiguous and
can be interpreted both as a wakeup call highlighting a potential source
of danger (McMullen and Markman, 2000) or as a success indicating
that margins were good enough (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008, Plous, 1991;
Tinsley et al., 2012). We investigate this dilemma by asking participants
about thoughts and emotions following accidents and near-accidents in
traffic, and by assessing whether prior incidents inspire caution or
confidence.
We start with a brief review of research exploring the role of
thoughts and feelings related to accidents and near-accidents, using
counterfactual thinking as a theoretical framework. Then we present
results from drivers reporting on their safety-related traffic behavior as
well as cognitions and feelings associated with accidents and near-ac-
cidents.
2. Learning from accidents
Often accidents lead to increased caution. Negative events tend to
grab attention, lead to more thorough and detailed-oriented processing
of information, and motivate cognitive activity aimed at understanding
what went wrong (Lieberman et al., 2002; Markman et al., 2007).
Whereas the hindsight bias (Fischhoff and Beyth, 1975; Roese and
Vohs, 2012) sometimes leads to overconfidence and complacency
(Wilson and Gilbert, 2008), negative events typically trigger counter-
factual thinking and corrective action (Epstude and Roese, 2008; Roese,
1997; Roese and Epstude, 2017). Thus, failures tend to activate feelings,
thoughts, and mindsets that help improve future performance and
thereby increase caution.
3. Learning from near-accidents
Learning from near-accidents is less straightforward. We discuss two
models that demonstrate some of the complexity involved in such
learning, one suggesting that near-accidents sometimes inspire more
confidence than caution, the other suggesting the opposite.
3.1. Counterfactual thinking: Outcome bias and affective contrast
In order to determine whether a given outcome is a success or
failure, we must rely on some reference information for the evaluation,
typically social (Festinger, 1954), temporal (Albert, 1977; Wilson and
Ross, 2000), or counterfactual (Kahneman and Miller, 1986; Markman
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and McMullen, 2003). In counterfactual thinking, comparing reality to
a better alternative (upward comparison) typically results in negative
affect signaling that corrective action is required. In contrast, thinking
that things could be worse (downward comparison) results in positive
affect and indicates that margins were good enough. Consequently,
whether an outcome is considered a success or failure is influenced by
the counterfactual alternative to which it is compared, and negative
outcomes (e.g., spraining your arm) might be evaluated positively if it is
easy to imagine a counterfactual that is even more negative (breaking
your arm) (e.g., Teigen, 1995). This can even lead to a satisfaction re-
versal in that people who are objectively worse off feel better about the
outcome (Medvec et al., 1995; McMullen and Markman, 2002), and are
more optimistic about future success (Clark et al., 2013; Wohl and
Enzle, 2003; Zhang and Covey, 2014). Accordingly, a problem with
learning from near-accidents is that they might not even trigger the
attentional, cognitive, and attributional resources required to search for
and detect the warning signals embedded in a near-miss.
Results from research on near-misses in organizational decision
making (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008) provide an even stronger argument
for why near-accidents do not foster increased caution. Consistent with
an outcome bias (Baron and Hershey, 1988), Dillon and Tinsley re-
ported that the evaluations of decision outcomes were heavily depen-
dent on final outcomes. Near-misses, situations where a negative out-
come is feared but avoided, were evaluated similarly to successes and
significantly more favorable than failures. This was true both for final
outcomes and of the decisions leading up to it (see Svartdal, 2011, for
similar results). Dillon and Tinsley (2008) termed this effect a near-miss
bias and reported that exposure to certain types of near-miss experi-
ences not only fail to act as a warning signal but may even promote
risky decision-making. This increased willingness to take risk seem to
relate to the process by which people update risk estimates, and appears
to be affective rather than cognitive. A near-miss event contains case-
specific information that triggers associative reasoning and an update of
the relevant hazard category in memory. Consequently, we subse-
quently perceive the category to which the risk belongs as less affec-
tively threatening and become more risk-accepting in future decision
making. A potential consequence of this process is that repeated ex-
perience with near-accidents will serve to increase one’s sense of safety,
as each additional experience confirms the safety of the situation or
hazard.
3.2. Counterfactual thinking and avoidance motivation
Alternatively, near-accidents could increase caution, as is indicated
from studies investigating the motivational effect of downward coun-
terfactuals for avoidance motivation (e.g. Markman and McMullen,
2003; McMullen and Markman, 2000; Pennington and Roese, 2003;
Svartdal, 2011). For example, in the Reflection and Evaluation Model
(REM), Markman and McMullen (2003) distinguish between two pro-
cessing modes: reflection and evaluation. The evaluation process in-
volves using a counterfactual outcome as a standard of comparison to
evaluate the factual outcome, which typically leads to the affective
contrast effect described previously. Reflection, on the other hand, in-
volves mentally simulating and experientially reflecting on the coun-
terfactual as if it were true, thereby assimilating the negative feelings
associated with that outcome. This assimilation effect could be an im-
portant component in avoidance motivation, as is at least implicitly
suggested by studies of people having experienced accidents and near-
accidents (e.g., Teigen, 1995).
People who have been in dangerous situations appear to be quite
insistent on rather dramatic downward counterfactuals and tend to
imagine that the outcome could have been much worse (Teigen, 1995,
1996, 2005; Teigen et al., 2011). Consequently, reports of good luck,
relief, and even gratefulness are particularly frequent in situations
characterized by risk and hazards (Teigen, 1997, 1998; Teigen and
Jensen, 2011). However, the positive emotions in such situations could
still represent a functional mechanism to the extent that such incidents
represent “close calls” that one should try to avoid in the future. Here
one must differentiate between the affect activated by situational cues
that trigger immediate counterfactual thinking (Roese, 1994; Russell,
2003), and the full-blown conscious emotions (relief, gratitude) that
stimulate further counterfactual analysis and elaboration over beha-
viour and possible outcomes in the aftermath of the situation
(Baumeister et al., 2007; Epstude and Roese, 2008; Roese, 1994). For
avoidance motivation, downward counterfactuals and the emotions
that accompany them may be particularly useful for driving home les-
sons for the future after near-accidents, indicating that close calls in fact
foster increased caution.
4. The present study
The research discussed indicates (1) that accidents tend to foster
increased caution, and (2) that near-accidents might sometimes inspire
confidence and sometimes caution. This ambiguity makes near-accident
experiences particularly interesting, both theoretically as discussed, but
they may also be important for learning in real-life settings. To our
knowledge, no previous research has addressed what and how in-
dividuals might learn from near-accidents that are relevant to one’s
personal safety.
The traffic domain is particularly well suited to examine learning
from accidents and near-accidents, as it represents a domain where
experience with such events are both frequent and potentially of high
consequence (World Health Organization, 2013). Furthermore, whereas
improvements in road and vehicle safety has lead to a reduction in fatal
traffic accidents, the number of non-fatal accidents have not been de-
creasing at the same rate and have in some countries even increased,
indicating a need for studies addressing behavioral aspects of road
safety (Berecki-Gisolf et al., 2013; Weijermars et al., 2016; Williams
et al., 2006). For example, young drivers, and young men in particular,
are overrepresented in accidents statistics (e.g., Clarke et al., 2005;
Gheorghiu et al., 2015), also in rural areas of Norway (Bakke et al.,
2013). These findings have been linked to high involvement in risky
behaviors, such as speeding, driving under the influence, and other
forms of sensation seeking (Bakke et al., 2013; Cestac et al., 2011;
Iversen and Rundmo, 2002). Consequently, understanding how traffic
accidents and incidents affect subsequent driving behavior is both
practically and theoretically important, particularly among younger
drivers.
In the present study, respondents first answered questions addres-
sing safe driving behavior, enabling us to obtain an index reflecting our
primary outcome variable: Safe driving. Then participants reported on
their experience with accidents and near-accidents as well as thoughts
and feelings associated with such events. As an accident signals that an
important barrier has been crossed, experience with accidents should be
associated with increased caution, and even more so with repeated
experiences. In contrast, as repeated experience with near-accidents
signal both resilience and vulnerability, two outcomes are possible: On
the one hand, repeated experiences may induce increased caution, or
alternatively, repeated experience with near-accidents may have an
opposite effect, as each additional experience confirms that margins
were good enough.
At least two factors may modulate such learning effects. First, ex-
periencing an accident or near-accident may promote learning de-
pending on prior accidents/near-accidents history. For example, a
possible scenario would be that experiencing a near-accident would
promote learning given a prior history of accidents, but not in the ab-
sence of prior accident history. To assess such interactions, we ex-
amined possible main as well as interaction effects in changes in our
safe driving index. We also assessed the possible modulating effect of
gender and age, as research on road safety behavior has linked young
age (particularly for men) to risky traffic behavior. Second, whether
near-accidents are associated with increased caution or not may depend
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on emotional and/or cognitive reactions associated with these in-
cidents. We therefore explored the role of counterfactual thoughts and
emotions for learning after accidents and near accidents. Specifically,
we expected that dramatic downward counterfactuals – imagining that
an experienced outcome could have turned out much worse - should
foster learning. Furthermore, learning from accidents and near acci-
dents should depend on the specific emotions elicited by such experi-
ences. For instance, if learned cautiousness depend on downward
counterfactual comparisons, learned cautiousness should also be asso-
ciated with positive emotions such as relief and gratitude. In contrast, if
learned cautiousness depend on upward counterfactual thinking, cau-
tiousness should be associated with the negative emotions of un-
pleasantness and regret. Finally, learning from accidents and near-ac-
cidents should depend on causal attributions. We therefore explored if-
then-statements generated by participants for the direction of com-
parison (upward vs. downward) and focus (self-focused vs. other-fo-




The sample consisted of 614 participants (367 women). Participants
were recruited through a mailing list at UiT The Arctic University of
Norway and through snowballing in two social media platforms:
Facebook (www.facebook.com) and Reddit (www.reddit.com/r/norge).
Data from 17 respondents were removed prior to analysis due to in-
complete responses on key variables, leaving a final sample of 597
participants. Participants were primarily of Norwegian nationality
living in one of the three northernmost counties of Norway. The ma-
jority were aged 18–23 (34%) and 24–29 (44%), 21% were aged 30–38,
and 1% were 39 or older, indicating that we have primarily recruited a
sample of Norwegian students. As is seen in Table 1, both accidents and
near-accidents were quite common in our sample, with near-accidents
reported by 74% of participants and accidents reported by 43% of
participants. The Norwegian Public Roads Administration does not
collect data on near-accidents, but estimates indicate 9000–40,000
road-accident injuries annually (Norwegian Public Roads
Administration, 2018), suggesting that near-accidents are even more
common.
5.2. Material and procedure
We developed and distributed a questionnaire using Qualtrics
(Qualtrics, Provo, UT). All participants received the same ques-
tionnaire, introduced as a study “…aimed at understanding risk beha-
vior and accident experiences among drivers.” Participants read that
the survey would take approximately 15–20min to complete, that
participation was voluntary, and that one could exit the survey at any
time. Participants were asked to provide demographic information on
(sex, age, place of residence, and year of driving after requiring a li-
cense). To ensure participant’s anonymity, we collected information
about age in five-year intervals, and residency was only specific to
county and country. We did not collect IP-addresses.
5.3. Safe driving behavior
Participants first answered 47 questions concerning safe driving
behaviors. Items were included to reflect important aspects of safe
driving, including speed, safety-relevant car maintenance, and caution
in traffic. Examples are “I follow scheduled services on my car;” “I make
sure my tires have the recommended tire pressure” (safety); “I always
check my vehicle’s blind spot before switching lanes;” ”I always
maintain a safe distance to other vehicles on the road” (caution in
traffic); and “I often driver more than 10 km/t above the speed limit in
residential areas;” “I often drive more than 20 km/t above the speed
limit on the highway” (speed). Participants rated all items on a 7-point
interval scale (1=not at all descriptive of me, 7= very descriptive of
me). Before analysis, items describing risky driving behaviors were
reverse coded, higher scores indicating safe driving behavior.
5.4. Accidents
Participants were then asked whether they had previously been in a
traffic accident. Predefined alternatives were provided at an ordinal
level as: “never, once, twice, 3–4 times or five-or-more”. Participants
who had experienced at least one accident were then asked to think of a
specific accident and evaluate the valence of (a) what actually happened
and (b) what could have happened on separate six-point interval scales
(1= very negative, 6= very positive). The scales were reverse-coded
into negativity scales prior to analysis. Participants also rated their
feelings of unpleasantness, anger, regret, relief, joy, and gratitude
during the incident on five-point interval scales (1= not at all,
5= very much). Unpleasantness and relief were intended as measures
of general affect, regret, and anger as measures of specific self-focused
and other-focused negative emotions, and joy and gratitude as self-fo-
cused versus other-focused positive emotions. Participants were then
asked to which degree the accident had contributed to making them a
more cautious driver on a five-point interval scale (1=not very much,
5= very much).
5.5. Near-accidents
Next, participants were asked to indicate previous experience with
near-accidents, to evaluate both the factual and counterfactual outcome
on separate six-point interval scales, and to rate their feelings of un-
pleasantness, anger, regret, relief, joy, and gratitude during the in-
cident, in the same manner as for the previous question about accidents.
As we were particularly interested in near-accidents in this study, we
also asked participants to evaluate the degree to which they felt (a)
personally responsible for causing the incident, (b) that someone else
was responsible for causing the incident, (c) causally responsible for
resolving the situation, and (d) that someone else was responsible for
resolving the situation. Answers were given on four separate five-point
interval scales (1= not at all, 5= very much). Furthermore, partici-
pants were asked to consider how the incident could have turned out
differently, and formulate the considered sentiment with an if-then
statement in an open-ended sentence completion task. Participants
were also asked to indicate the degree to which the near-accident had
contributed to making them a more cautious driver on a five-point in-
terval scale (1= not very much, 5= very much). Finally, participants
were thanked for their participation and debriefed.
5.6. Statistical analysis
The items measuring safe driving (47 in total) were averaged into a
safe driving index. In addition, we computed subscales to assess com-
pliance with speed limits, cautious driving under winter conditions (an issue
highly relevant in the region of data collection) attention to vehicle
maintenance, and attention to traffic. The Cronbach alphas for the sub-
scales were 0.82 (compliance with speed limits; 7 items), 0.73 (attention to
Table 1
Number of participants experience with accidents and near-accidents.
Experience with accidents and near-accidents
Zero One Two 3–4 5+ Total
Accidents 341 152 77 25 2 597
Near-accidents 156 141 112 108 80 597
Note. The two participants having experienced 5+ accidents were moved to the
3–4 accidents category in all analyses.
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vehicle maintenance; 6 items), 0.74 (cautious driving under winter condi-
tions; 3 items), and 0.55 (attention to traffic; 3 items). The individual
subscales correlated highly with the composite index of all four sub-
scales (r=0.58 – r=0.75) as well as with the mean of all the 47 safe
driving items (r=0.46 – r=0.75). The correlation between the mean
of all safe driving items and the mean of the subscales was r=0.92.
Consequently we focused on the Safe driving index in the analyses re-
ported here.
To assess factors associated with safe driving, the Safe driving index
was subjected to analysis of variance (ANOVA) with number of acci-
dents and near-accidents as predictors. In these analyses, years of
driving after obtaining a driver’s license, gender, and age were also
entered in the model, testing main effects of accidents and near acci-
dents as well the accident * near-accident interaction. We also tested
the interaction between near-accident experiences and gender, age and
years of holding a drivers license, as reviewed research indicate that
experience, age and gender are risk factors in road safety.
Self-reported changes in cautiousness after accidents and near-ac-
cidents were limited to participants having experienced at least one
accident/near-accident. As is seen in Table 1, 341 participants reported
having had zero accidents, whereas 156 participants reported zero
near-accidents. Also, note that these estimates reflect relative rather
than absolute estimates (“increased caution”). We subjected these es-
timates to Spearman rank-order correlational analyses, as accident and
near-accident experiences were ordinal variables and changed cau-
tiousness was measured at an interval level.
In exploring possible mechanisms involved in learning from acci-
dents and near-accidents, Pearson correlations were used to test the
specific expectation that changes in cautiousness was related to
downward counterfactual comparisons. Ordinary least squares regres-
sions were used to further explore the relation between self-reported
changed carefulness and the specific emotions experienced after acci-
dents and near-accidents. Finally, the relation between perceived causal
responsibility and learned carefulness were explored with ordinary
least squares regression models and by participants’ counterfactual
thoughts as measured with an If-then sentence completion task. Mean
scores on the self-reported changed cautiousness measure were ana-
lyzed with ANOVA models, with direction of comparison (upward vs.
downward) and focus (self-focused vs. other-focused) as between group
factors.
We used G*Power 3.1.9.2 to calculate the required sample size.
Assuming medium effect sizes (0.25), alpha levels of 0.05, and
power= 0.95, ANOVAS testing main effects between up to five groups
(as was the case of near-accidents) required a sample size of 400.
Testing interactions, with df=12 at the most, required a sample size of
425. For the regression analyses, assuming the same parameters, five
predictors on a single dependent variable required a sample size of 45.
For all statistical analyses, we used Statistica 13.4 (TIBCO Software,
Inc.).
6. Results and discussion
6.1. Safe driving behavior
To assess the potential effect of experience with accidents and near-
accidents on overall Safe driving, we entered these two predictors as
well as gender, age intervals and years holding a driver’s license as
categorical predictors in a mixed ANOVA. The analysis indicated a
significant effect of near-accidents, F(4, 514)= 3.93, p= .004, partial
eta squared= 0.03, a nonsignificant effect of accidents, F(3,
514)= 0.94, p=ns, and a significant effect of gender, F(1,
514)= 4.45, p= .04, partial eta squared=0.01. The effect of gender
reflected that women demonstrated a higher mean Safe driving score
compared to men. Importantly, no significant accidents * near-accidents
interaction was observed, F(12, 514)= 0.87, p= .583, indicating that
experience with different numbers of accidents did not affect near-
accidents, and vice versa. The complete results are presented in Table 2.
As can be seen from Table 3, the significant effect of near-accidents
was due to the fact that an increased number of near-accidents was
associated with a lower Safe driving score (4.94 in the 5+ group). Also,
note that the transition from zero to one accident/near-accident was
not accompanied with any change in the safe driving index.
To explore potential factors modulating the relation between Safe
driving and near-accident experiences, both the near-accident * gender
and near-accident * years holding a certificate interactions were ana-
lyzed, demonstrating nonsignificant effects. The near-accident * age
interaction (age recoded to three levels, 18–23, 24–29, and> 30 years)
was significant, F(8, 524)= 2637, p= .008, partial eta squared=0.04.
As can be seen in Fig. 1, and as predicted, the interaction effect reflects
that the reduction in scores on Safe driving seems to be more pro-
nounced in the two youngest age groups.
Overall, these results indicate that an increased number of accidents
was not associated with changes in the Safe driving score, whereas
Table 2
Mixed ANOVA model predicting score on Safe driving index based on experi-





F sig Partial η2
Intercept 3321.90 1 3321.90 5746.73 0.001 0.918
Accidents 1.64 3 0.55 0.94 0.420 0.005
Near-accidents 9.09 4 2.27 3.93 0.004 0.030
Accident * Near-
Accident
5.99 12 0.50 0.87 0.583 0.020
Gender 2.57 1 2.57 4.45 0.035 0.009
Age 0.01 2 0.01 0.01 0.993 0.001
Years of driving 0.68 2 0.34 0.59 0.556 0.002
Error 297.12 514 0.58
Table 3
Mean and standard deviation of safe driving behavior for accidents and near-
accidents depending on the number of accidents and near-accidents.
Safe driving following accidents and near-accidents
Zero One Two 3 or 4 5 or more
Accidents N=303 N=137 N=72 N=27 Na.*
5.35 (0.76) 5.21 (0.76) 5.26 (0.81) 5.26 (0.91) Na.*
Near-
accidents
N=129 N=129 N=102 N=102 N=77
5.42 (0.74) 5.36 (0.70) 5.39 (0.71) 5.24 (0.77) 4.94 (0.92)
Fig. 1. Scores on Safe Driving depending on age group and number of near-
accident experiences.
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increased number of near-accidents was associated with a reduction in
safe driving scores. Note that there were no changes between not
having had accidents/near-accidents and having had one. Women de-
monstrated an overall higher safe driving score compared to men, but
no modulating effect of gender was found on the relation between re-
peated near-accident experiences and safe driving. Age appeared to
modulate the relation between near-accident experiences and safe
driving, reflecting that near-accidents inspired less caution in the
younger age groups.
6.2. Self-reported changed caution following accidents and near-accidents
When participants were asked specifically about increased caution
after a particular accident or near-accident, both seemed to induce in-
creased caution. The mean caution estimates are displayed in Table 4. A
Spearman rank-order correlation showed a significant positive asso-
ciation between number of accidents and changed cautiousness after
accidents, rs(254)= 0.232, p < .05, but no significant association
between experience with near-accidents and changed cautiousness, rs
(430)=−0.042, p > .05, indicating that only experience with acci-
dents foster increased caution.
Using the subjective estimates of increased cautiousness and
number of incidents as predictors, and Safe driving as the dependent
variable, the ANOVA indicated no effect of the increased cautious-
ness * accidents interaction, nor of the increased cautiousness * near-
accidents interaction. Thus, the subjective changes in cautiousness were
not reflected in the Safe driving index, indicating a dissociation between
a more “objective” measure of driving safety and subjective changes.
Even participants reporting having been “much” or “very much” more
careful after near-accidents demonstrated marked reduction in their Safe
driving scores after 3–4 and 5+ near accidents.
6.3. Possible mechanisms
In examining possible mechanisms involved in learning from acci-
dents and near-accidents we found little support for the hypothesis that
downward counterfactual comparison would inspire caution, as corre-
lations between the valence of the counterfactual outcome and learned
cautiousness were low, for both accidents (r(256)=−0.14, p < .05)
and near-accidents (r(423)=−0.06, p > .05).
Rather, learned carefulness appeared to be related to upward
counterfactual comparisons, as the negative emotions of regret
(Accidents: β=0.28, p < .001; Near-accidents: β=0.20, p < .0001)
and unpleasantness (Accidents: β=0.22, p < .001; Near-accidents:
β=0.36, p < .0001) significantly predicted increased cautiousness.
Relief (Accidents: β=0.07, ns; Near-accidents: β=0.03, ns) and gra-
titude (Accidents= β=0.11, ns; Near-accidents: β=0.11, ns) did not.
Turning to the four variables measuring perceived causal responsi-
bility, only the statement assessing personal responsibility for causing
the near-accident predicted changed cautiousness (β=0.31,
p < .0001). Importantly, there was no association between changed
cautiousness and the degree to which participants themselves
(β=−0.05. p= .40) or someone else (β=0.06, p= .23) were re-
sponsible for avoiding a more serious incident, again suggesting that
upward rather than downward comparisons inspire caution.
A similar pattern was found analyzing the if-then statements gen-
erated after near-accidents. Participants reported higher caution fol-
lowing upward (M=3.32; SD=1.37) compared to downward com-
parisons (M=2.83; SD=1.39), F(1, 244)= 7.60, p < .01, and
following self-focused (M=3.91; SD=1.09) compared to other-fo-
cused counterfactuals (M=2.76; SD=1.38), F(1, 208)= 24.52,
p < .0001. Learned cautiousness after near-accidents appeared to be
contingent on assuming personal responsibility and on self-focused,
upward counterfactuals.
7. General discussion
The present research investigated thoughts and feelings associated
with accidents and near-accidents in traffic, investigating if and how
such experiences affect cautiousness in traffic. Cautiousness was mea-
sured by an index for safe driving behavior, as well as a measure re-
flecting self-reported increase in caution following accidents and near-
accidents. We expected accidents to increase caution, and existing lit-
erature suggests two alternative effects of near-accidents: Near-acci-
dents may increase caution (i.e., scare people straight) or boost con-
fidence (i.e., a near-miss bias).
The results showed that repeated experience with near-accidents
was associated with a significant decrease in the safe driving behavior
score, whereas no learning occurred after accidents. As for self-reported
change in cautiousness, no learning effect occurred after repeated ex-
periences with near-accidents, but increased caution was reported after
two or more accidents. These results may indicate a dissociation be-
tween our measure of safe driving safety and subjective report of in-
creased caution. Examining possible mechanisms involved in such in-
cidents, changes in cautiousness was primarily determined by how
unpleasant the situation had been, and by how much regret participants
felt about the situation, indicating that upward rather than downward
counterfactual thinking promotes learning. Finally, analysis of near-
accident experiences demonstrated that self-focused upward counter-
factuals were associated with learned cautiousness.
We now first discuss how our results relate to earlier research on the
near-miss bias, before turning to the relation between downward
counterfactual thinking and avoidance motivation.
7.1. Increased caution vs. boosted confidence
The finding that experience with near-accidents is associated with a
decrease in safe driving behaviors is consistent with previous studies
demonstrating a near-miss bias following near-accidents (Dillon and
Tinsley, 2008; Tinsley et al., 2012). The near-miss bias occurs when
near-misses are not recognized as such and consequently motivate in-
creased risk taking in subsequent decision-making (Dillon and Tinsley,
2008; Tinsley et al., 2012). The near-miss bias has previously been
demonstrated in both scenario-type studies (e.g., Tinsley et al., 2012)
and in laboratory experiments (e.g., Tinsley et al., 2012). The present
research relied on an index of safe driving over independent groups of
respondents with increasing numbers of near-accidents experienced,
the results indicating that increased exposure to near-accidents is
Table 4
Mean and standard deviation of self-reported changed cautiousness for accidents and near-accidents depending on the number of accidents and near-accidents.
Changed cautiousness following accidents and near-accidents
One Two 3 or 4 5 or more Total
Accidents N=152 N=77 N=27 Na.* N=256
3.00 (1.35) 3.68 (1.38) 3.59 (1.44) Na.* 3.27 (1.38)
Near-accidents N=140 N=108 N=104 N=80 N=432
3.08 (1.42) 3.19 (1.27) 3.14 (1.38) 2.84 (1.35) 3.07 (1.36)
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associated with complacency rather than urgency, thus extending the
scope of near-miss bias to a new domain with potentially high im-
portance.
On the increased cautiousness measure, participants seemed to de-
monstrate a somewhat different pattern, with increased caution fol-
lowing repeated accidents and no change following near-accidents. This
discrepancy could indicate a dissociation in safety perception, partici-
pants believing they change whereas in reality, they do the opposite.
However, we tend to believe that these measures address different as-
pects of driver safety, one focusing on respondents’ typical safety be-
havior, the other on increased caution linked to self-selected episodic
memories of examples of incidents. For instance, participants may have
adjusted a safety relevant behavior based on a particular episode
(skidding on the ice), such as changing to better tires or being more
mindful when driving, but that behavior modification may not sig-
nificantly impact the overall score on the safe driving measure. It is also
potentially important to note that the safe driving index is an absolute
measure, whereas self-reported change is a relative measure. In either
case, both measures agree that near-accidents do not increase caution.
Age appeared to be a factor modulating the relation between near-
accidents and safe driving, indicating that younger drivers may be
particularly inclined to ignore the warning signals imbedded in a near
miss. This is consistent with research showing that younger drivers are
more frequently involved in accidents (e.g., Bjørnskau, 2000; Clarke
et al., 2005; Gheorghiu et al., 2015), particularly accidents involving
driving under the influence, speeding and other forms of sensation
seeking behavior (Bakke et al., 2013; Cestac et al., 2011; Iversen &
Rundmo, 2002; Tränkle et al., 1990). The present study did not include
any measure of sensation seeking, or other measures of motivation in
relation to driving. Future studies could include such measures, as
younger drivers may have a more promotion (i.e., focus on technical
skills) rather than prevention (i.e., safety concerns) oriented approach
to driving, something that could be expected to modulate how near-
accident experiences are interpreted.
7.2. Possible mechanisms in learning from accidents and near-accidents
Although our results are broadly consistent with an impact bias, the
present results qualify the impact of such a bias, as they demonstrate
that taking personal responsibility for causing an incident leads to in-
creased caution. This finding was supported by an analysis of the
counterfactual statements generated in response to the near-accident:
participants were more inclined to learn when they responded to the
incident with self-focused counterfactuals, and when they responded
with upward as opposed to downward counterfactuals. This is con-
sistent with previous findings indicating that self-focused upward
counterfactuals are beneficial for learning, as such thoughts both in-
crease motivation to improve and specify how change should be im-
plemented (Epstude and Roese, 2017; Morris and Moore, 2000).
However, it is not consistent with our expectation that downward
counterfactual thinking would “scare people straight”, and therefore
impact safety relevant behavior.
In light of this, it is paradoxical that both previous research (Teigen,
1995, 1996, 1998; Teigen and Jensen, 2011) and the present results
indicate that people often engage in downward counterfactual thinking
after accidents and near-accidents. Why spend time thinking about
worse case scenarios, if one learns more from thinking about how the
incident could have been avoided (an upward counterfactual)? It is
possible that the primary function of downward counterfactuals is not
to motivate behavior directly, but rather motivate deliberate analysis
and reflection that then, in turn, promotes insight and learning. Several
researchers have proposed such a link between conscious emotion and
behavior (Baumeister et al., 2007; Epstude and Roese, 2008). This
would indicate that time should be an important variable prediction
upward versus downward comparisons after accidents and near-acci-
dents, such that the immediate reaction is a downward counterfactual
that may subsequently motivate upward counterfactual thoughts about
how a negative incident could have been avoided. Future research
should address this question.
7.3. Implications and limitations
This study is based on a convenience sample consisting of mostly
young, college educated drivers from Northern Norway. Our prime aim
was to explore a theoretically grounded research question, and in this
respect, the generalizability of the results should be further explored in
future studies. Still, the results should be interpreted with care, as they
may be influenced by traffic conditions and culture found in Northern
Norway. For example, darkness during much of the winter, harsh
driving conditions, and long driving distances between cities may not
be comparable to other parts or Norway or other countries. The present
study focused on a few key demographic variables believed to be of
particular relevance for learning from accidents and near-accidents.
Future studies should explore the effect of other demographic variables
that may be of importance. For instance, living in densely populated
cities may promote different traffic habits than livining in rural areas
(Bakke et al., 2013). Also, differences in income or education could be
expected to influence both attitudes to driving and the make or model
of car one normally drives, which again might influence traffic beha-
vior.
The present study asked participants about their experience with
accidents and near-accidents, but no clear definitions of such events
were given. Thus, although having participants sample experiences
from memory may add ecological validity, differences in understanding
of what was meant by “accidents” and “near-accidents” may have in-
duced higher variability in evaluations, which again makes it harder to
detect effects of such experiences. Future research should apply clear
criteria for differentiating between accidents and near-accidents. It
should also be noted that we relied on self-report measures of both safe
driving behavior and learned cautiousness, and hence do not know
whether these measures connect with actual behavior. Future research
would benefit from measuring the effect of near-accidents on actual
driving behavior.
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